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Mediating claims through critical anthropomorphism
Commentary on Key on Fish Pain
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Abstract: Key’s (2016) discussion of his claim that fish do not feel pain ignores the history of
attempts to study the attribution of mental states to other species. Although willing to accept
that mammals feel pain, Key claims that fish lack the mammalian neural mechanisms underlying
pain and are unconscious of their experiences. Consequently, we do not need to be overly
concerned about fishing practices that would otherwise be viewed as painful. Key uses a flawed
anthropomorphic lens. All attributions of mental events to organisms other than oneself involve
inferences derived from anthropomorphic processes through which we process physiological and
behavioral data. To do this effectively we need to employ a critical anthropomorphism
incorporating our experiences as sentient beings along with diverse scientific findings, avoiding
claims that some types of data always trump other considerations.
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“Our anthropocentric way of looking at things must retreat further and further, and the
standpoint of the animal must be the only decisive one” (von Uexküll, 1909/1985, p. 223).

The above epigraph is one I used years ago (Burghardt, 1991), but it is appropriate here as well.
Key’s (2016) target article is clear in its goals and conclusions. His main contention is in the last
sentence of the abstract: “… fish lack the necessary neurocytoarchitechture, microcircuitry and
structural connectivity necessary for the neural processing required for feeling pain.” But
despite Key’s forceful prose and assertions, things are not quite that conclusive. Those who
accept that other species have mental states — and hence disagree with Key — also need to
avoid traps set by their protagonists. One of these traps is to shift the focus, as in Key’s first
paragraph, from pain to the much broader concept of consciousness and problems in defining
and recognizing “consciousness” rather than sticking to the topic under discussion: the nature
and importance of the neural and behavioral aspects of pain and aversive states in general. My
dictionary defines “sentience” as “a state of elementary or undifferentiated consciousness.” This
sets the bar rather low. I will argue here that consciousness is not the key issue at all.
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When Griffin began his advocacy of cognitive ethology and published his influential little book
(Griffin, 1976), he omitted the entire early literature on animal mentality, specifically Romanes
(1883) and, to a lesser extent, Morgan (Burghardt, 1985). The charge of anthropomorphism was
hurled at Griffin, just as it had been at the earlier authors, especially Romanes. And although
many of the examples used have indeed been anecdotal and uncritical, it is just as uncritical an
error to omit the perspective of the animal (or another person; Rivas & Burghardt, 2002). Like
consciousness, anthropomorphism can mean many different things. I have accordingly
advocated a critical anthropomorphism in which our “statements about animal joy and
suffering, hunger and stress, images and friendships, are based on careful knowledge of the
species and the individual, careful observation, behavioral and neuroscience research, our own
empathy and intuition, and constantly refined publically verifiable predictions” (Burghardt,
1997: 268).
Key might feel encouraged by a recent detailed analysis of how we use our cognitive abilities
and biases to attribute mental states to nonhuman entities (Urquiza-Haas & Kotrschal, 2015).
However, in neurobiology, a rapidly developing field with a changing conceptual and
methodological landscape, a general conclusion should not be based on selected data derived
from a few species. Neurobiology is littered with claims about species that could or could not
see color or discriminate wavelengths, but behavioral experiments have often shown that color
perception is context-specific and cannot be predicted on the basis of structure alone (Kelber,
Vorobyev, & Osario, 2003). There have also been claims that reptiles, having only a reptilian
brain, could not have positive emotions (MacLean, 1985, 1990); or, more recently, that animals
“below” reptiles could not play because they do not have emotions and thus consciousness
(Burghardt, 2005; Cabanac, 1999). Despite confident earlier assertions to the contrary (e.g.,
Maier & Schneirla, 1935), in recent decades numerous cognitive skills have been discovered that
had been thought to be beyond the ability of ectothermic animals (e.g., Bshary, Wickler, &
Fricke, 2002). Whether these abilities need to be accompanied by “consciousness,” is not as
critical to decisions about animal welfare as behavioral continuity. We need to get beyond
arguments invoking either neural analogical inference or subjective analogical inference —
points made long ago (Burghardt, 1985) and not, I believe, effectively refuted. As a recent book
on dog behavior points out, studies focused on classical ethological analysis along with basic
learning processes can foster more understanding than some current anthropocentric
interpretations of dogs (Coppinger & Feinstein, 2015). This stance seems applicable to fish as
well as to uncritical anthropocentrism (Burghardt, 2007).
A short commentary cannot do justice to the topic, but it should also be noted that many fishes
have large brains; mormyrids have huge cerebellums, covering the entire surface of the brain
(Butler & Hodos, 1996), with a larger brain to body mass ratio (4.4%) than humans (Bullock,
1977). Hence claims that pain, in the human or even mammalian sense, is absent in these
animals are perhaps not as germane as the need to avoid the horrible mistreatment of complex
creatures with multifaceted cognitive and behavioral abilities that we are only beginning to
fathom. Financial costs to the fishing industry should not blind us to what we think is
problematic. Society is implementing more humane rearing and slaughter of cows, chickens, and
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other domesticated animals without demanding detailed neuroscientific support for each
change in procedure. Is Key perhaps not being critical enough in accepting the neuroscientific
rationale that is being invoked to justify cruel treatment of “alien” beings rather than honestly
admitting that this is just a case of human interests trumping other factors?
Although the nature of subjective experience is only partially accessible to objective science, we
must keep trying to understand it despite current scientific limitations. Toward this end, I think
it is essential to develop a fifth aim for ethology concerning the private experiences of “the
other,” without bringing in human consciousness as the essential barometer (Burghardt, 1985,
1997). I will leave it to other commentators to discuss the behavioral, phylogenetic, and neural
research addressing Key’s claims. Although I think Key is too wedded to neural reductionism, his
provocative thesis on a currently timely topic does deserve to be carefully discussed and
evaluated.
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